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Empowerment allows individuals to reach their full potential, to improve their political and social
participation, and to believe in their own capabilities. Gender empowerment also has important
ramications for the rest of the household; empowered women have fewer children and higher child
survival rates (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982; Dyson and Moore, 1983), healthier and better-fed
children (Lundberg, Pollak and Wales, 1997; Kanbur and Haddad, 1994), and a generally greater
allocation of resources to children (Thomas, 1990; Handa, 1996). Development programs have
aimed to empower women by increasing their control over contraceptive choices, by providing them
access to credit, and through education.
Women's empowerment is particularly hard to achieve within a generation because it is driven
not only by information about choices, but also by the acceptability of these choices. Communities
are often governed by strict social norms, which can both be driven by and drive the choices
traditionally made by women in the village. If the social stigma associated with working outside
the home or using contraceptives is prohibitive, then mere access to education or birth control may
not change empowerment outcomes. Instead, providing access to women who have made dierent
choices can expand information sets and demonstrate the outcomes associated with these choices.
As an alternative to targeting individual women, empowerment for women may be aected by
combining learning and inuence through community action and peer networks.
In this paper, we use primary data from rural north India to examine the impact of a program
called Mahila Samakhya on female empowerment outcomes. Mahila Samakhya aims to empower
women by educating them. The program provides literacy camps, adult education classes, and
vocational training. The program also creates support groups on issues of social importance, such
as domestic violence and alcoholism. We measure empowerment using (1) the ownership of iden-
tication cards for the national government's rural employment guarantee scheme, which proxies
for access to outside employment, (2) the ability to leave the household without permission, which
reects physical mobility, and (3) participation in weekly village council meetings, which measures
political participation. The literature identies access to outside employment, physical mobility,
3and political participation as three important components of gender empowerment. These variables
represent a wide variety of domains in which a program like Mahila Samakhya can empower women:
economic, social, and within the household.
Mahila Samakhya is an innovative approach to improving female empowerment. While a number
of programs aim to improve female empowerment through education, Mahila Samakhya combines
education with support groups, and has the explicit objective of increasing gender empowerment.
We posit that this program aects female bargaining power in two ways. First, education provided
by the program directly improves job prospects and increases the reservation wage; the program
thus helps empower women to control a greater share of the household's resources and to become
more active participants in their communities. Further, the program may have an indirect eect
through improved information ows that may change social norms. These social spillovers also
empower participants who do not have access to outside employment and thus do not benet from
the direct employment aspect of Mahila Samakhya (Montgomery and Casterline, 1996). As a result,
even unemployed participants and non-participants may be empowered by Mahila Samakhya.
In establishing whether Mahila Samakhya has a signicant impact on female empowerment, we
need to account for two potential sources of endogeneity: (1) the program's choice of communities
in which to operate, and (2) the individual's choice of whether then to participate. Hence, we
conduct our analysis in four stages: rst, we match non-participants in treated districts (referred
to hereon as \non-participants") and women in untreated districts (referred to hereon as \the
untreated"), in order to examine whether they are signicantly dierent from each other. This step
allows us to observe whether the program is targeted in placement over observables. If the program
were targeted to communities where women have low initial bargaining power, not controlling for
endogenous placement would lead to underestimates of the actual treatment eect. However, if
non-participants and the untreated are not signicantly dierent from each other, we can posit that
the program is not targeted towards areas of most need and that targeted placement is unlikely to
aect estimates.
Second, we test whether program participants are signicantly more empowered than similar
women from untreated districts to determine whether the program has a signicant treatment
4eect. We use matching and instrumental variables in this step. Our instrument relies on the roll-
out of the program to control for selection in the participation decision. Using both approaches,
we nd a positive, signicant treatment eect of the program on women's empowerment outcomes;
participants are more likely to have access to outside employment, are able to leave the house
without permission and are more likely to attend village council meetings, although this last eect
is not signicant in all specications. The marginal eects from the IV approach emphasize the
potential for large numbers of women to benet from interventions like Mahila Samakhya.
Third, we focus on participants who do not work, comparing them to the untreated who also
do not work. Using both instrumental variables and matching, we nd that even participants who
do not benet from the enhanced employability from participation are signicantly more likely to
leave the house without permission. Results also suggest that participants who do not have access
to outside employment are more likely than non-participants without access to outside employment
to leave the house without permission and to participate in the village council. Fourth, we compare
non-participants to untreated women to test for the presence of spillover eects in treated areas.
We nd that non-participants in treated villages have greater access to outside employment, greater
physical mobility and higher attendance of village council meetings than untreated women, which
point to the positive spillover eects of Mahila Samakhya.
Most studies of program impact analyze interventions targeted at the individual. Only a small
number of papers examine community-level interventions because these programs often aim to
change outcomes that are dicult to measure and use methods that combine direct individual in-
tervention (education) with the process of the intervention (community meetings). Thus, evaluating
community-level programs often poses the dual diculty of imprecisely-measured outcomes and a
\treatment" that is hard to identify. In this paper, we use changes in outcomes and an instrument
suggested by detailed eld tests to disentangle the mechanisms of the program and identify the
eect of the program on female empowerment.
Few other papers study Mahila Samakhya; one of these papers focuses on the program's eect
on building village-level social capital and trust rather than studying its intended impact on female
empowerment (Janssens, 2010). In other work, Kandpal and Baylis (2013) explore whether Mahila
5Samakhya aects the diversity of participants' peer group, while Kandpal and Baylis (2011) study
whether peers' participation improves female bargaining power and child welfare outcomes; neither
of these studies explicitly estimates treatment eects of the program's intended impact, which is to
empower women through participation.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. It is the rst to evaluate the impact
of Mahila Samakhya on empowerment outcomes, and provides robust estimates of the various
eects of this program. We decompose the eect of community-level interventions like Mahila
Samakhya into its three components: (1) a direct treatment eect that works through o-family
farm employment opportunities, (2) a direct eect that works through higher reservation wages,
and (3) an indirect eect that works through information channels of social inuence and learning.
We consider the issues arising from truncation in matching participants and untreated, and attempt
to correct for truncation. As a result, this paper may provide valuable evidence on the eectiveness
of community-level interventions in changing ingrained social outcomes like women's bargaining
power. Our results establish that the Mahila Samakhya program directly and indirectly increases
female empowerment.
2 Background on Uttarakhand and Mahila Samakhya
Uttarakhand is a a small rural state in the Indian Himalayas, comprising less than one percent
of the Indian population. Only ve cities in the state contain more than 100,000 people. On the
surface, Uttarakhandi women may appear to be more empowered than the average. These women
led the Chipko movement to prevent deforestation1 as well as the demand for a separate state.
However, looking beneath the surface reveals a dierent story. Although the state has a literacy
rate of 72 percent, the Census reports that only 60 percent of all women are literate.2 A more
detailed measure of literacy from a nationally representative household survey nds 43 percent of
Uttarakhandi women cannot read at all, while an additional 5 percent can only read parts of a
1The Hindi word Chipko means \to stick". In the Chipko movement of the seventies, Uttarakhandi villagers, and
women in particular, literally hugged trees to prevent deforestation.
2The national literacy rate is 65 percent, and female literacy of 54 percent. The most literate state is Kerala,
with a 91 percent overall literacy rate and 88 percent female literacy rate.
6sentence (International Institute for Population Studies and Macro International, 2007). Therefore,
the eective literacy rate for females may be closer to 50 percent.
Although 43 percent of all Uttarakhandi women work, 64 percent of these women were not paid
for their work, and over 70 percent worked in agriculture. These women are likely to work on their
family's farmland, which does little to empower them. In addition, 23 percent of Uttarakhandi
women have no say over how their household spends money, and almost 43 percent do not have the
nal say on their own healthcare. Over half (55 percent) did not have the nal say on large purchases
made by their household (International Institute for Population Studies and Macro International,
2007). Hence, Uttarakhandi women can lead very restricted lives with little say in the household
or community.
In 1988, Mahila Samakhya was launched in three states of India to empower women through
formal, informal, and vocational education. In theory, the community-level program was placed
in districts identied by (1) low rates of female education, (2) low school attendance by girls, (3)
remoteness, and (4) lack of development and restricted access to infrastructure. In practice, as our
results will highlight, the program does not appear to be targeted. Participation in the program
is voluntary, and no monetary incentives are oered.3 The program entered Uttarakhand in 1995
and covers 2,416 villages in six of thirteen of Uttarakhandi districts. More than 42,000 women
participate in this program, and over 2,500 girls have been educated in its centers.
Mahila Samakhya conducts biweekly literacy camps and provides continuing education to women
and girls. The camps and continuing education classes are provided to a cluster of three to ve
villages, depending on the size of the class and the proximity of the villages. Classes are capped
at twenty ve women. The program also oers weekly vocational training to enable participants
to earn an income. Participants have used the training to become midwives, herbal medicine
manufacturers, bakers, grocers, candle makers, and tailors. Such training is intended to improve
the participant's employability, giving her access to job opportunities o the family farm, and hence
improving her level of empowerment in the household and the community. In addition, the program
provides special education on resolving domestic disputes and conicts within the community.
3When participants travel to district-meetings, they are housed and fed at the program headquarters, and their
travel expenses are reimbursed.
7The program also encourages women to participate in village politics as a means of self-
empowerment. In eld tests, we observed participants hearing about the success women have had in
the labor force and the important roles women can play in Indian society. They were also told about
the benets of having a daughter and of not discriminating against her. Groups of participants that
meet on a weekly basis provide support on issues like domestic violence, alcoholism, dowry, and
female infanticide. These groups vary in size from ve to fteen women, and foster ties between
participants. These secondary interventions have the potential to generate signicant spillover ef-
fects wherein even participants who cannot work outside the home or family farm, and therefore
do not benet directly from improved employability, can be empowered by their participation.
Mahila Samakhya enters a village through program workers called sahayoginis. The worker
rst conducts several rounds of talks with local women to determine what their needs are, and
what they would like from the program. This process can take up to several weeks, but as a
result, the program's activities are tailored to each village. The program often starts with literacy
or education camps because these are the most frequently-voiced concerns. Initially, only a few
women may participate, but as others see the benets of participation, they muster up the courage
to participate despite family opposition.
The program can meet with resistance from the men in the village, who may see the program
as subversive and be unwilling to let their wives participate. In such cases, workers stress the
educational rather than empowerment component of the the intervention. Once the men observe the
benets of participation, generally in the form of earnings, they reduce their opposition. Sometimes,
as the women become more mobile, men might again oppose participation, but usually the women
are suciently empowered at this point that the opposition no longer restricts their involvement.
The program is funded by the Indian government and the British Department for International
Development. Annual national and state reviews of the program use summary statistics to evaluate
its eectiveness in increasing female empowerment, as measured by educational attainment, the
regularity of village- and district-level group meetings, and political participation in the village
council. Reviews also use information from focus groups to gauge whether the program has raised
the level of condence and the sense of community in participants.
83 Literature Review
The literature on female empowerment largely follows two approaches. The rst set of studies
considers the determinants of female empowerment. The second set of studies examines dierent
proxies for female empowerment. Female empowerment is measured by a woman's ability to make
household decisions, relative to her husband's ability to make household decisions. Since this ability
cannot be explicitly measured, economists study whether variables such as education, contracep-
tive use, and asset-ownership are correlated with high female empowerment. These self-reported
variables reect the wide variety of choices and decisions at stake in the household bargain: em-
ployment, fertility, and resource allocation. Empowerment itself has been measured by a woman's
relative physical mobility, economic security, decision-making ability, freedom from domestic vio-
lence, and political awareness and participation.
A large body of literature nds that a woman's access to employment outside the house increases
her household bargaining power (for a study in Bangladesh, see Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; for
a study in India, see Rahman and Rao, 2004). The ownership of assets, in particular, is one
important way through which access to employment helps empower women in developing countries
(for example, see Agarwal, 2001, for evidence from India). In addition, several analyses have found
that access to credit programs| whether through micro-nance organizations or rotating savings
and credit associations (ROSCA)| has a positive eect on female empowerment (for a study in
Kenya, see Anderson and Baland, 2002; for a study in Bangladesh, see Hashemi, Schuler and Riley,
1996).
Studies have also found a positive link between empowerment and contraceptive use (for a
study in Bangladesh, see Schuler and Hashemi, 1994), as well as between the woman's inuence
on resource allocation and her family's social status (for a study in Bangladesh, see Quisumbing
and de la Bri ere, 2000). In particular, the more educated she and her father are relative to her
husband, the more empowered she is. Relative physical mobility is another important determinant of
autonomy, dened as degree of control over microcredit loans, since it reects the woman's access to
outside employment opportunities (Hashemi, Schuler and Riley, 1996). A study of the determinants
9of female autonomy in India nds that a better-educated woman has greater bargaining power, as
measured by physical mobility and say in household resource allocation, through the channel of
increased information (Rahman and Rao, 2004). The same study also nds culture, as measured
by state xed-eects, to signicantly increase bargaining power despite controlling for religion and
caste. Further evidence from India shows strong positive correlations between female education as
a proxy for bargaining power, and freedom of movement and better maternal health as bargaining
outcomes (see Malhotra, Pande and Grown, 2003 for a review of this literature).
The literature further agrees that the clearing of marriage markets depends on the number of
men and women in the market (for theoretical models, see Becker, 1973a,b; Neelakantan and Tertilt,
2008). As a result, the local sex ratio works through the spousal age ratio to inuence marriage
markets and therefore household bargaining power. Scholars have found that, particularly in the
Indian context, women have less bargaining power if their husbands are signicantly older (for
evidence from India, see Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell, 1983; Kantor, 2003).
Since empowerment is an unobservable latent variable, economists use its observable character-
istics as proxies for empowerment. Women with high values of the proxies, such as a greater spousal
age ratio, access to outside employment or a high level of political participation, are also likely to
have greater bargaining power. Thus, the indicators of a high level of empowerment include (1)
access to outside employment, (2) physical mobility, and (3) political participation (Anderson and
Eswaran, 2009; Hashemi, Schuler and Riley, 1996; Rahman and Rao, 2004). The corresponding
dependent variables we use to reect high levels of female autonomy are (1) the ownership of iden-
tication cards for the national government's rural employment guarantee scheme, which proxies
for access to outside employment, (2) the ability to leave the household without permission, which
reects physical mobility, and (3) participation in weekly village council meetings, which measures
political participation. We choose these variables because they represent a diverse set of ways in
which the Mahila Samakhya program can potentially empower women.
With the exception of analyses of credit extension mechanisms, the studies discussed above focus
on interventions targeted at the individual. Only a small number of papers look at community-level
interventions. For instance, Imai and Eklund (2008) use survey data on a women's community-
10based organization in rural Papua New Guinea to assess the eectiveness of autonomous women's
groups compared to those that receive external support. Their analysis| using a Heckman Selection
Model as well as Propensity Score Matching| shows that the autonomous groups are more eective
in improving child welfare. Thus, community-level interventions targeted at women can generate
signicant benets to children's well-being.
One of the few analyses of Mahila Samakhya uses data from the state of Bihar to evaluate
the program's eect on community-level trust and social capital (Janssens, 2010). The paper uses
Propensity Score Matching to calculate Intent-to-Treat estimates of the program. Matching women
from treated villages to those from untreated villages, results suggest that the program signicantly
increases trust and engenders social capital. Participants are more likely to contribute to local
educational and infrastructural community projects. Signicant spillovers also exist with non-
participants; non-participant households in program villages exhibit higher levels of trust and are
more likely to engage in community building activities than households in non-program villages.
Other work examines allied aspects of the program without explicitly evaluating it: Kandpal and
Baylis (2013) ask whether participation aects the diversity of participants' peer group, while Kand-
pal and Baylis (2011) examine whether friends' participation improves female bargaining power and
child welfare outcomes. None of these studies considers the causal model behind the mechanisms
of community-level interventions. Next, we present a model that decomposes the eect of program
participation in a community-level intervention.
4 Decomposing the Eect of Program Participation
Participation in Mahila Samakhya can have a direct eect by improving a woman's job prospects,
and an indirect eect that changes perceived social norms through information spillovers. We
attempt to decompose the eect of participation in Mahila Samakhya into these two eects. Par-
ticipation in the program directly increases the woman's educational attainment, which in turn
improves her job prospects (Phipps and Burton, 1998), potentially leading her to nd employment
outside her home. Further, even a participant who does not work may benet directly from the ed-
11ucation because when bargaining with her husband over household resources, knowing about better
job opportunities and having more marketable skills increase her disagreement utility.4 The direct
eect of the program thus works through employability, skills, and reservation wages, which in turn
aect bargaining power through outside options. The education gained through this program is
therefore expected to raise bargaining power. By contrast, the indirect eect works by expanding
the woman's information set about alternatives, and therefore aecting her perceived social norms.
Following Montgomery and Casterline (1996), we can think of a woman facing an optimization
problem in which she chooses a course of action c in order to maximize her expected utility. Let
the set fc1;:::;cNg represent the universe of choices that a woman could potentially make, and let
fc1;:::;cKg, where K  N, represent the subset of choices that the woman is aware of as being
available to her. The choice that the woman makes as a result of her household bargain leads to one
of several possible outcomes, indexed by the variable j, where each outcome is associated with a
vector of the \determinants of the woman's well-being", Yj (Montgomery and Casterline, 1996, p.
157). Let P(Yjjc;I) represent the probability of the woman experiencing the vector of determinants
Yj, which is conditional on the choice made by her, c, and her information set, I. Then, the vector
of determinants Y1 occurs with probability P(Y1jc;I), Y2 occurs with probability P(Y2jc;I), and
so on. The vector Yj thus represents the outcome of the household bargain, given the components
of the woman's information set.
Consider a woman who gets vocational training and then chooses to become a candle maker,
cj. Her decision to engage in this outside employment aects the amount of her household income
she controls, Yj, which is an outcome of her household bargain. The eect of the bargain outcome
on her individual utility is denoted by U(Yj); thus, Yj is the outcome of the household bargain,
facilitated by cj, and is a determinant of the woman's utility. Then, the woman's expected utility
4The disagreement utility is simply each spouse's intertemporal utility if they remained single or if they were
non-cooperating in marriage, and depends on the spouse's own earning potential and the partner's earning potential
as well as on the non-cooperative equilibrium outcome of investment in children (Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green,
1995, p. 839).






The woman's information set I consists of:
I = (pt;qt;E(pt+1);E(qt+1);E(Yt+1jc);2;Z); (2)
where pt and qt are known current prices and quantities of the goods and services consumed by
the woman. Expected future prices and quantities, E(pt+1) and E(qt+1), and the expected future
vector of private determinants of well-being, E(Yt+1jc), have associated variances 2. Z is a vector
of all remaining constraints and costs.
By educating a woman, Mahila Samakya improves her household bargaining position and in-
creases her expected lifetime outcomes.5 We can think of this education as adding a choice cK+1,
where K + 1  N, to the woman's existing choice set. For example, choice cK+1 may be getting a
job that would not have been feasible without the education. We assume that this choice can only
be added by Mahila Samakya because there is no other opportunity for formal or vocational adult
education.
Some women may not select the newly available choice cK+1. However, the education provided
by Mahila Samakya gives these women the potential to choose cK+1, which increases their reserva-
tion wage and leads them to directly benetting from the program. For example, the addition of
cK+1 to the womans choice set can lead to an increase in P(Ynjcm;I), where cm is a choice that
was available before the educational component and Yn is an improved outcome for the woman.
The program's indirect eect works through spillovers from social learning and social inuence,
as well as social norms. Participants learn about new opportunities and new behaviors from each
other, which expands each woman's choice set and can improve her expected utility. So, while par-
ticipation expands choice sets, it also changes expectations of future employment and empowerment
5Even in cases where education is an irrelevant alternative, the woman is not worse o than before, hence
participation leads to a weak improvement to her household bargaining position.
13outcomes, given specic choices.
Changing expectations to reduce the variance of outcomes associated with previously unknown
choices can improve individuals' expected utility. Assuming that these women are risk-averse, even
if certain choices were available to them, the unknown distribution of outcomes associated with
these choices might discourage them from making these choices. For example, if a woman lives
in a village where all women only work on the farm, the variance in possible outcomes associated
with choosing to work o the family farm may be large. A woman considering working o the
farm may be worried that her family will ostracize her or not let her see her children. However,
meeting women who do work outside the home may give her a more realistic picture of the outcomes
from working outside the home, and may help her realize that the probability of some of the worst
outcomes is considerably lower than she had previously thought.
By inuencing the behavior of participants, the program also indirectly aects non-participant
friends of participants. We can think of this indirect eect as working through the non-participant's
information set. Exposure to participant friends may change the non-participant's expectations in
two ways: (1) by expanding the set of choices known to her through her network, and (2) by
changing her expectation of future distribution of outcomes, E(Yt+1jc) as well as the associated
subjective variance, 2, by showing her what happens if she makes a certain choice. Over time,
as more and more participants change their behavior (by becoming educated, getting a job, having
greater bargaining power in the household), the social norm also changes to become less restrictive
on all women, regardless of their participation status. As a result, the program's indirect eect may
be substantial.
Now consider the marginal eect of participation in Mahila Samakhya. If participation changes
the utility-maximizing choice available to a woman from cK to cK+1, then the marginal eect of
participation on her utility is as follows:
jU(Yj)P(YjjcK+1;I)   jU(Yj)P(YjjcK;I) (3)
Having more choices must make participants at least weakly better o, therefore implying that
14P(YjjcK+1;I) rst-order stochastically dominates P(YjjcK;I). Corresponding to the marginal
eect in equation 3, if spillovers change the information set from I to I0, then the marginal eect
of participation on utility is as follows:
jU(Yj)P(Yjjc;I0)   jU(Yj)P(Yjjc;I) (4)
Since Mahila Samakhya may expose women to information that certain outcomes are in fact sig-
nicantly worse than previously thought, rst-order stochastic dominance of P(Yjjc;I0) does not
always follow. However, assuming that women are risk-averse, the variance-reducing eect of Mahila
Samakhya on the information set, by itself, would always increase participants' utility.
In summary, via the two direct and one indirect eects discussed above, Mahila Samakhya
can expand the woman's choice set fc1;:::;cKg, and the newly available choice cK+1 increases the
probability of the woman obtaining a more favorable value of Yj (and decreases the probability of
obtaining an unfavorable Yj). Further, information can adjust expectations and perceived variance
so as to also adjust the subjective probability distribution of outcomes.
5 Data
5.1 Survey description
We use primary data on the participation in Mahila Samakhya, measures of female empowerment,
child welfare, and social networks of 487 Uttarakhandi women. The survey, described in detail
in Kandpal and Baylis (2011), covers six Uttarakhand districts, four with the program and two
without. The villages in our sample were randomly chosen from the six districts. The sample size is
487 women. The survey was designed to trace self-reported networks, and hence was implemented
using restricted snowball sampling. The survey instrument includes the following key questions to
help identify the eect of participation in the Mahila Samakhya intervention on an individual's level
of empowerment:
 Female Empowerment Dependent Variables:
15{ Access to Outside Employment: Whether the respondent has an identication card for
the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS).
{ Physical Mobility: Whether the woman can leave the house without permission.6
{ Political Participation Whether the woman participates in the local village council.
{ Proxy for Initial Bargaining Power: The woman's age relative to that of her husband.
 Participation:
{ Whether the woman participates in the Mahila Samakhya intervention.
{ How long the program has been in her village.
{ Exposure to the program: the interaction of the number of years the program has been
in her village with the woman's age minus sixteen.7
 Other Socioeconomic Characteristics
{ Literacy and educational attainment.8
{ The number of children born to the woman and their ages. The number of boys and
girls.
{ The amount of time, in minutes, a woman spends collecting rewood each day.
{ The number of rooms in the house and the primary source of lighting.
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, NREGS, guarantees at least a hundred
days of paid work to the rural poor. Having an identication card (or having their name listed on
the household card) gives the women access to outside employment. However, program supervisors
6Since this variable is dicult to verify, it might suer from reporting bias: participants know the \correct answer"
to this question is that they do not need permission to leave the house, and thus might be systematically more likely
to overstate their physical mobility than non-participants. However, in eld tests, we observed that participants were
signicantly more sensitive to their lack of household bargaining power and were likely to underreport the amount
of say they had in the household because the program had made them aware of the entire feasible set of outcomes
for women. Therefore, if we were to expect a sizable reporting bias by participants, it would be in the downward
direction, i.e. participants would be likely to underreport their physical mobility.
7We subtract sixteen because women younger than sixteen cannot participate.
8We asked participants about literacy and educational attainment prior to participation. Because the program
is not viewed as a school, many participants distinguished between their educational attainment and learning via
Mahila Samakhya even without our asking.
16sometimes deny women these cards or refuse to add their names to the existing household card
because the work generated by NREGS is of a manual nature, and is thus considered \unsuitable"
for a woman. Mahila Samakhya ocers encourage participants to demand the cards, and where
necessary, to report the supervisor to the local administrative ocer. As a result, owning NREGS
identication cards is positively correlated with participation in Mahila Samakhya, and by giving
women access to outside employment, it is a proxy for female empowerment.
We distinguish between pre-determined empowerment characteristics, like the spousal age ratio,
and characteristics that might be aected by participation, such as owning an NREGS identication
card or participation in village council meetings. Since Mahila Samakhya targets married women,
and none of the women in the sample participated in the program before marriage, the spousal age
gap is not aected by program participation. Program ocials of the Mahila Samakhya intervention
in Uttarakhand told us that women married to much older men have little say in the household,
because often the age gap arises from a second marriage for the man, or some \undesirable" quality
in the woman or her background. Hence, we treat a woman's spousal age gap as a proxy for her
pre-participation level of empowerment. We cannot rule out the possibility that an older relative of
the woman, say her mother, is a Mahila Samakhya participant and that therefore the respondent's
age at marriage was not completely unaected by participation. However, program participants
tend to be young women, and the program only came into the region in 1995, so the inuence of the
participation of an older relative on a later participant's marriage decision is likely to be minimal.
The dierence between matched pre-determined empowerment characteristics of participants
and untreated women thus provides a baseline level of empowerment for participants. After es-
tablishing that matched participants and untreated women do not have signicantly dierent pre-
determined levels of empowerment, we use the spousal age ratio to control for dierences in initial
bargaining power when estimating the eect of participation on characteristics like owning an
NREGS identication card.
175.2 Summary statistics
As table 1 shows, the average woman in the sample is 32 years old, while her husband is 38 years
old. She married at age 19 and has 9 years of education, one less than her husband. Her sons are an
average of eight years old, while her daughters average six years of age. In the regressions reported
below, we use the number and age of children; only twenty women reported not having any children
at all; the average number of children is 1.15, with an average age of 7.42. The average woman's
house has three rooms and electricity. Sons and daughters have, on average, equal amounts of
education; about three years.
Table 2 indicates that participants are signicantly more empowered than non-participants.
While on average, 61 percent of the women in the sample said they had NREGS cards, only 49 per-
cent of non-participants did. In contrast, over 68 percent of participants had these cards. Similarly,
while 71 percent of the sample said they did not need permission to leave the house, only 59 percent
of non-participants but 78 percent of participants did not need permission. Finally, while only 14
percent of non-participants reported attending village council meetings, almost half of all partici-
pants did. In summary, whether in the form of access to employment, physical mobility, or political
participation, women who participate in Mahila Samakhya have higher levels of empowerment. Of
course, these statistics do not tell us whether more empowered women are simply targeted by or
self-select into the program, or whether participation actually improves female autonomy.
Table 3 shows us key characteristics of the four treated and two untreated districts in the
sample. The only two signicant dierences are in the number of sons and the time spent on
collecting rewood. On average, participants have 0.27 sons more than non-participants and spend
signicantly more time collecting rewood. The magnitude of the dierence in the number sons
suggests the economic impact, if any, is small. However, the dierence in time to collect rewood
is large, making it important to control for the dierences in time constraints as reected by this
variable. We discuss this variable in further detail in the next section. The rest of table 3 shows
that the program does not appear to be targeted in placement because there are no other signicant
dierences between the average characteristics of women in treated and untreated districts. These
18data illustrate that the women we sample in treated and untreated districts are largely similar in
covariates.
It is possible that untreated districts in our sample are not representative of statewide trends and
that women in these districts may be empowered than average, implying that program placement
may be targeted. However, when using NFHS-3 (International Institute for Population Studies and
Macro International, 2007) and DLHS-3 (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and International
Institute for Population Studies, 2010) data, we nd that the women in untreated districts in our
sample do not dier signicantly from the rest of the state. For instance, the average age at at
marriage for Uttarkhandi women is 20.6, while in our untreated sample, it is 19.8. Similarly, 43
percent of all Uttarkhandi women work and 45 percent of the untreated women in our sample do.
The total fertility rate in the state is 2.6, which corresponds closely to the average family size of
one boy and one girl in our untreated sample. Finally, while 84 percent of the state has access to
electricity, 90 percent of our untreated sample does. This lack of signicant dierences suggests
that the program is not targeted at districts by levels of female empowerment.
Table 4 indicates the presence of self-selection into Mahila Samakhya. The average participant
is three percentage points closer in age to her husband than the average non-participant in treated
districts, which suggests that women with greater initial bargaining power may self-select into the
program. Further, participants tend to have older and more sons than non-participants, although
the dierences are not signicantly dierent from zero. Participants are less likely to live with
their husbands; the dierence of 19 percent is highly signicant. Participants are also marginally
signicantly less likely to live with their parents-in-law. And nally, participants are signicantly
more likely to be Brahmin than non-participants.
Several other characteristics, such as the number and age of daughters, the spousal education
ratio, and the woman's time to collect water, are not statistically dierent for participants and non-
participants. Further, none of the wealth indicators, including number of rooms, electrication,
improved toilet facilities, materials used in oor and wall construction, are dierent for these two
groups, suggesting that poorer participants neither select into the program nor are they targeted
based on indicators of wealth (number of rooms, electrication, access to improved toilet facilities,
19and nature of the construction materials used for the oor and walls of the house). Nonetheless,
this table highlights the importance of controlling for selection in to the Mahila Samakhya program.
6 Empirical Analysis
6.1 Methodology
We estimate two sets of treatment eects. The rst examines whether non-participants in treated
and untreated districts are signicantly dierent in terms of female empowerment outcomes. The
second estimates the impact of the program on participants relative to untreated women with similar
characteristics to account for any issues of self-selection. Although table 3 suggests the lack of any
substantial dierences between treated and untreated districts on observables, the rst estimate
more formally tests this assumption.
To account for potential targeted placement of or self-selection into the Mahila Samakhya pro-
gram, rst we use Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to match women in treated and untreated
districts, and then use both PSM and an instrumental variables approach to control for self-selection.
When treatment assignment or participation is not random but determined by observables, PSM
allows us to compare treated individuals to untreated individuals (or non-participants to the un-
treated) using observables such as demographic and economic characteristics to construct the control
group. Each individual in the dataset is assigned a propensity score that tells us the likelihood of an
individual being treated. That propensity score is a conditional probability measure of treatment
participation, given observable characteristics, x, and is expressed as follows:
Pi(x) = P[Di = 1jX = x]; (5)
We conduct this analysis maintaining the unconfoundedness assumption (Imbens and
Wooldridge, 2009):
20Di ? (Yi(1);Yi(0))jPi(x) (6)
where ? signies independence, given that the balancing condition is satised (Cameron and
Trivedi, 2005). The unconfoundedness assumption implies treatment assignment, Di is independent
of empowerment outcomes, Yi (corresponding to the Yi in section , after controlling for propensity
scores. In other words, we assume there are no unobservables that aect empowerment outcomes
and the probability of treatment.
Treated and untreated individuals are matched based on proximity of their propensity scores,
Pi(), thus creating a control group. We then estimate treatment eects by comparing the outcome
of interest for the treated and control groups. PSM eliminates selection bias if controlling for
x eliminates selection bias from endogenous placement. Because treated and untreated districts
do not dier signicantly with respect to observable characteristics (table 3), it is a reasonable
assumption that the distribution of individual unobservable characteristics is similar across treated
and untreated districts. Because the program appears to have been distributed randomly across
districts, and individual selection into the program does not dier by district, a PSM approach will
give an unbiased measure of the program impact.
For the treatment eect comparing non-participants and the untreated, each non-participant is
matched with replacement an untreated woman based on the closeness of the propensity score. For
the treatment eect comparing participants to untreated individuals, each participant is matched
with replacement with an individual from an untreated district. We use kernel matching in which
all treated observations are matched with a weighted average of the propensity score for all control
observations. Weights are inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity scores of
treated and control observations (Becker and Ichino, 2002). We conduct this matching in Stata
using psmatch2 (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003).
Truncation may be a concern here because we are matching the full distribution of women in
untreated districts to a subset in treated districts that has chosen to be treated. Untreated women
21represent the full distribution of outcomes, while participants represent a left-truncated sample
of this full distribution. If uncorrected, this truncation could bias our treatment results upward.
Hence, after matching the full sample of participants to untreated women, we truncate the sample
of untreated to only include women whose propensity to participation is no lower than the lowest
participation propensity for participants. Similarly, we also re-estimate the match between non-
participants and the untreated only including untreated women whose propensity score is no greater
than the highest propensity score for non-participants.
Propensity Score Matching only accounts for selection or targeting on observables. While we
have argued above that Mahila Samakhya may not be targeted in its placement, women still chose
whether to participate, and PSM may not fully control for all the unobservable factors governing a
woman's participation decision. To prevent contamination from unobservable characteristics inu-
encing participation, we use two-stage least squares (2SLS) and instrument for participation using
exposure to the program. Our instrument for participation in Mahila Samakhya is the number
of years the program has been in a village interacted with the woman's age minus sixteen. The
youngest participant we encountered in our eld tests or data collection was sixteen; we subtract
sixteen from the age of the woman to accurately reect the number of years she could have par-
ticipated in the program. However, older women can send their daughters to the program's girls'
education centers. The instrument tells us the years of exposure to the program, and any eect
of this variable on female empowerment likely works through participation in the program, rather
than directly. This variable is driven by the year the program started in the village as there is little
migration among married women in the region. Since women often migrate at the time of marriage,
and we do not know whether the woman's natal village had the program, migration at the time of
marriage might lead to measurement error, which in turn would bias results downwards. However,
unmarried women tend not to participate in the program, so exposure would have to be indirect,
and thus the resultant bias would be small.
The dependent variables measuring empowerment are of two kinds: (1) pre-determined char-
acteristics (proxied for by spousal age ratio) which cannot be aected by Mahila Samakhya, and
(2) characteristics that can be aected by participation, like having an NREGS identication card,
22leaving the house without permission, and attending village council meetings. The independent
variables on which we conduct the match and the 2SLS regression include observed factors that
likely aect both program participation and female empowerment: (1) spousal age ratio, dened
as the respondent's age over her husband's age, (2) the number and age of her children,9 (3) her
years of education, whether she is literate (in the case of participants, whether she was literate
prior to participation), and whether she has less than four years of education (and is thus likely to
need the education provided by the program). Time constraints may play an important factor in
determining participation and bargaining outcomes, so we also include (4) the time spent each day
by the respondent on collecting rewood (reecting time constraints),10 and (5) whether she lives
with in-laws and the number of sisters-in-law living with her (reecting whether she can leave her
children in someone's care while participating in the program), (6) whether she is a Brahmin, (7)
the number of rooms in her house, and (8) whether her house has electricity. Village xed eects
are also included.
6.2 PSM Results
Table 5 presents the two sets of treatment eects discussed above: the rst comparing non-
participants to the untreated, and the other comparing participants to the untreated. The upper
panel of the table shows the results comparing non-participants to the untreated. These results tell
us that a non-participant is not signicantly more empowered by simply living in a treated district.
Without matching, only the NREGS cards variable is signicantly dierent, with non-participants
being signicantly more likely to own NREGS cards. The decrease in signicance in NREGS card
ownership after matching highlights the importance of controlling for selection in to the program.
9To address concerns over whether the spousal age ratio and the age and number of children are truly exogenous,
we re-estimated all the results presented below without these three variables. The corresponding results are stronger
in signicance than the results including these variables, but the signs and magnitudes are similar. If the spousal
age ratio and age and number of children are not inuenced by participation, but indicate pre-existing levels of
empowerment, and if we have self-selection into Mahila Samakhya, our estimates of the eect of participation would
be biased upward if we excluded these variables.
10The variable time spent collecting rewood reects an exogenous time constraint on the woman because Uttarak-
hand is exogamous and patrilocal. Sons tend to live with their parents, and the location of a married woman's house
is not chosen by her and is therefore exogenous to the amount of time she spends collecting rewood. The more time
a woman spends each day on rewood collection the less time she has to participate in the program. However, it is
also possible that participants who spend a large amount of time collecting rewood may feel isolated and may thus
be more interested in the social capital building activities of the program.
23Indeed, given that treated and untreated districts are very similar, these estimates tell us that
Mahila Samakhya does not target districts with particularly low (or high) levels of empowerment.
The lower panel of table 5 presents treatment eects of the program on participants. These
results show that participants and untreated women have statistically equal spousal age ratios,
suggesting that individuals do not choose to participate based on initial bargaining power. Hence,
any dierences in the other measures of empowerment likely stem from the eect of the program.
Evidence suggests that the program signicantly increases access to outside employment, as 80.9
percent of participants own NREGS identication cards, compared to only 14.4 percent of untreated,
which translates to a dierence of 66.5 percentage points. Participants are also signicantly more
likely to leave the house without permission. However, according to the matched results, partici-
pants are not signicantly more likely to participate in village council meetings. A woman's ability
to participate in village-level politics may depend on a high-stakes bargain with her husband and
in-laws, while the decision to get an NREGS card may be the result of a lower-stakes bargain be-
cause outside employment will earn the household extra income. Political participation may depend
not only on program participation but also on the behavior of peers and support from them; this
link is studied in greater detail in Kandpal and Baylis (2011).
Table 5 also shows that program participation increases the likelihood of a woman working,
compared to untreated women; the associated t-statistic is 1.52, making this dierence short of
statistically signicant at the ninety percent level. In addition to an eect of the program on em-
powerment through increased employability, there may also be a sizable eect even on participants
who do not work. Since participation in Mahila Samakhya does not aect the woman's employ-
ment, it must instead work either by increasing the woman's disagreement utility and therefore
aecting the household bargain, or through the peer network eects of social learning and social
inuence. Table 6 presents treatment eects of the program on these women by matching them
to the untreated. Participants who do not work are still more likely to have an NREGS card and
to participate in village council meetings. They are not, however, more likely to leave the house
without permission, perhaps because without working and earning an income, they do not have
adequate intrahousehold bargaining power. The fact that women who don't work still own NREGS
24cards maybe because NREGS only generates a hundred days of employment; hence participants
may not have been working at the time of the interview, but still had access to the NREGS program.
However, simply observing improved outcomes for women who do not work does not let us
disentangle the eect of any changes in opportunity cost from an indirect, information-related
eect. To do so, we would need to isolate the eect of the program on women whose opportunity
cost does not change due to the program. Women who do not own NREGS cards are least likely to
have had their opportunity cost changed by the program: they do not work, and also do not have
access to outside employment, as represented by NREGS cards. Table 7 presents these treatment
eects, and shows that women who do not have NREGS cards are still more likely to participate in
village council meetings and to leave the house without permission. Thus, even women who do not
face increased opportunity costs from participation are more empowered than non-participants.11
We tried various specications as well as matching metrics for the matching process; results are
robust.
6.3 Results with Truncation Correction
A potential concern related to the use of PSM in comparing participants to women in untreated
districts is that our treated sample is truncated by only including those women who participate.
The true propensity of having access to Mahila Samakhya for women living in the treated districts
is one, so the best control-group matches would be women with high propensity scores in the
untreated districts. Therefore, by denition, women in villages without the program represent
the full distribution of outcomes, while treated women represent a left-truncated sample of this
full distribution. However, in the above matching process, we are comparing the full distribution
of women in untreated districts to a subset in treated districts that has chosen to be treated,
and therefore likely has higher propensity scores. If uncorrected, this truncation could bias our
treatment results upward.
11Further restricting the sample to women who do not work and do not have NREGS cards shrinks the sample
to 60 observations for the physical mobility estimation; the resultant treatment eect of 0.409 has an associated
standard error of 0.311 (t-statistic of 1.31). The political participation estimation, with 67 observations, yields a
treatment eect of 0.391, and a standard error of 0.235 (t-statistic of 1.66).
25Thus, we may have a right-truncated distribution of non-participants and a left-truncated dis-
tribution of participants in treated districts. The distributions of propensity scores for program
participation of treated and untreated women highlight the problem of truncation (gure 1). The
distribution of the untreated is bimodal, so we should not compare individuals in or around the lower
mode of the untreated distribution to participants. Similarly, comparing non-participants to indi-
viduals around the higher mode of the propensity scores for the untreated would also be misleading.
We correct for truncation by re-estimating the treatment eects comparing non-participants to the
untreated (presented in the upper panel table 5) with the sample of the untreated limited to those
whose propensity scores are below the lowest percentile of propensity scores for participants. For
the comparison between participants and the untreated, we limit the sample of untreated to women
with propensity scores for program participation greater than the lowest percentile of propensity
scores for participants. Results presented in table 8 indicate that truncation does not signicantly
inuence the outcomes presented in table 5: the sign, size, and signicance of the estimates do
not change for either comparison set (non-participants versus untreated, and participants versus
untreated).
The only exception is that non-participants are signicantly more likely to own an NREGS
identication card than the untreated, after controlling for truncation. In our eld tests, respondents
reported not having known that working outside the home was a possibility for them simply because
they had never seen anyone in the village do so. As a result of having participant friends, these
women may realize that working outside the home is in fact part of their choice set. The increase
in signicance in the truncation-corrected estimation thus suggests that having participant friends
may increase a woman's choice set by showing her that working on NREGS-generated projects is
a possibility for her. The access to employment o the family farm and not involving household
chores likely increases the woman's intrahousehold bargaining power.
6.4 2SLS Results
A second concern with PSM is that while matching can control for observed characteristics, it does
not control for unobserved characteristics that may aect women's outcomes. Here we discuss the
26results from the 2SLS estimation described above, where we instrumented for participation using
women's exposure to the program. The robust rst stage results presented in table 9 show that the
program exposure instrument is highly signicant and positively correlated with participation in the
program, validating the use of this instrument to predict participation. The rst-stage results also
tell us that Brahmin women are signicantly more likely to participate, as are women with greater
rewood collection times (suggesting that the increased interest in community building activities
dominates the time constraint), while women who live with their parents-in-law are less likely to
participate. The F-statistic for this rst stage is 12.38 for the physical mobility regression, 11.90 for
political participation, and 13.55 for the access to outside employment regression. All three values
are greater than the rule-of-thumb cuto of 10 proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997). To test
the validity of the instrument in the exactly-identied regression, we used the procedure outlined
in Nichols (2007), and added a non-linear transformation of the instrument (non-logged exposure
to the program), which allowed us to use Sargan's test for misspecication. Sargan's test results
suggest that the instruments are valid.
Robust second-stage results presented in table 10 show that Mahila Samakhya participants
are signicantly more empowered than non-participants in all three ways: participants are more
likely to leave the house without permission, to participate in village council meetings, and have
NREGS cards. The increase in signicance of the physical mobility and political participation
dependent variables highlights the importance of correcting for sample selection by instrumenting for
participation. Other than program participation, the empowerment outcomes seem to be the result
of dierent data generating processes, with little overlap in signicance of explanatory variables
across the three regressions. Results tell us that older women are more likely to participate in
village council meetings, but that the number and age of children is important in determining
whether the woman has an NREGS card{ women who have more children and of a younger age are
less likely to have NREGS cards, perhaps because the time constraints imposed by raising children
do not permit them to work outside the house. Women who live with their sisters-in-law are more
likely to leave without permission and to participate in the village council, which may be because
having the additional help around the house enables women to leave more easily. Brahmins are less
27likely to have NREGS cards, while women whose houses have electricity are more likely to go out
without permission. 12
The predicted outcomes based on 2SLS estimates are presented in gures 2 and 3. These
predicted values tell us that while 67.0 percent of non-participants can go out without permission,
only 49.4 percent of the untreated can do so. Similarly, 71.3 percent of non-participants have
NREGS cards, only 26.6 percent of the untreated do. Predicted political participation is low for
both groups; six percent of non-participants attend village council meetings, while 3.9 percent of
the untreated do.13 However, the fact that all predicted outcomes are higher for non-participants
than for the untreated suggests that Mahila Samakhya generates sizable spillover eects for non-
participants living in treated districts. Figure 3 tells us that 78.2 percent of participants can leave
the house without permission, 53.7 percent participate in the village council, and 79.7 percent
have NREGS cards. Compared to the predicted values for the untreated, these outcomes represent
signicantly higher levels of empowerment for participants. Participants are 28.8 percent more
likely to go out with permission, 49.8 percent more likely to participate in the village council, and
53.1 percent more likely to have access to NREGS cards.
We also estimated the treatment eects for women who do not have NREGS cards or those do
not work using 2SLS; robust second-stage results are presented in table 11. The estimates obtained
from 2SLS are similar to the treatment eects from matching: for women who do not work, we nd
that participants are signicantly more likely to have NREGS cards than non-participants, although
2SLS does not yield a signicant eect of participation on attending village council meetings. For
women without NREGS cards, we nd a signicant eect of participation in Mahila Samakhya on
12To address concerns over the robustness of our standard errors, we also used randomization inference (RI) (Rosen-
baum, 2002) to estimate the z-scores for the three empowerment outcomes. Rather than drawing repeated samples
of observations from the known full population, RI assumes that the population is restricted to the observed sample.
The treatment assignment is assumed to be the only random variable. All observed outcomes and covariates are
assumed xed. Using predicted participation from the rst-stage of the 2SLS regression as the continuous treatment
for RI, we nd participants to be more empowered than non-participants for all three outcomes. The z-scores are 6.53
for owning an NREGS card, 1.56 for going out without permission, and 4.73 for participating in the village council.
These results suggest that, with the exception of physical mobility, participants are signicantly more empowered
than non-participants.
13Thirty-six percent of all women in our sample attend village council meetings, but only 8 percent of untreated
women do. Fourteen percent of non-participants attend village council meetings, so the predicted outcome of 8
percent is signicantly lower. However, this discrepancy may simply highlight the importance of spillover eects
generated by Mahila Samakhya.
28the ability to leave the house without permission. The positive eect of participation on attending
village council meetings is signicant at the 90 percent level. Thus, again we nd that Mahila
Samakhya improves the bargaining power of not only women who work, but also of those who do
not have access to o-family farm employment. We posit that this eect comes from a combination
of increasing the woman's reservation wage and increasing her information set about alternative
choices. However, as presented in the last row of table 11, all but one of the rst-stage F-statistics
for these regressions are lower than 10, ranging from 7.27 to 8.54. The only exception is the physical
mobility regression for women without NREGS cards, where the F-statistic is 11.75. While we might
be concerned about weak instruments in this case, results from the Sargan test indicate that the
instruments are exogenous.
Restricting the sample further to those women who do not work and do not have NREGS cards,
we have 73 observations in the physical mobility regression and 78 in the political participation
regression. The rst-stage F-statistic for the physical mobility regression is 8.23, but is only 6.33
for the political participation regression; as a result, we do not report the results from this regres-
sion. We nd that program participation increases a woman's ability to leave the house without
permission; the associated t-statistic is 1.83, meaning that the estimate is signicant at the 90
percent level. Although the sample is small and weak instruments are a concern, these results
suggest that the indirect eect of Mahila Samakhya, working through increased reservation wages
and expanded information sets, can improve women's physical mobility, and thereby empower them
in intrahousehold bargains.
In summary, using both PSM and 2SLS, we nd that the Mahila Samakhya program empowers
women in a variety of ways, via both direct and indirect routes. In addition to directly increasing
access to outside employment, political participation, and physical mobility, our results suggest the
program generates signicant spillovers that allow non-participants to benet via greater access to
outside employment. The program also empowers participants who do not work (and therefore only
benet from an increased reservation wage) to participate in village council meetings. Finally, we
nd that participants who do not have access to o-farm work are empowered by greater physical
mobility and political participation than untreated women.
296.5 Interpreting Estimates
The marginal eect estimates obtained from 2SLS cannot be interpreted as average treatment
eects, and thus cannot be compared directly to the estimates obtained from PSM. Multiplying
2SLS marginal eect estimates with individual propensity scores for participation gives us the
distribution of treatment eects. The average of this interaction is, then, the average treatment
eect. In table 12, we present the 2SLS estimates for average treatment eects of participation for
the entire sample, participants, non-participants, and the untreated.
The average treatment eects from 2SLS and PSM, presented in gure 4, tell us that 2SLS
estimates for the impact of Mahila Samakhya are higher than PSM estimates for owning an NREGS
identication card and participating in village council meetings. The one exception is that the PSM
estimate of the impact on a woman's ability to leave the house without permission is greater than
the 2SLS impact estimate. This discrepancy may suggest that PSM was unable to control for some
of the endogeneity in the intrahousehold bargain that determines physical mobility; some women
may have intrinsic qualities| for instance, boldness| that lead them to participate and make them
more likely to go out of the house without permission and are uncontrolled for by PSM.
The marginal eect estimates point to the signicant benets from program participation. In
the untreated districts in our sample, 57.5 percent of all women (69 of 120 women) can go out of
the house without permission. If these districts were to be covered by Mahila Samakhya, our results
suggest that 75 percent (89 of 120 women) would be able to do so. Similarly, only 19 percent of all
untreated women (25 of 131 women) participate in village council meetings, whereas if the program
covered these districts, 41 percent of these women (55 of 131 women) would participate in village
council meetings. Finally, only 19 percent of the women had NREGS cards (27 of 140 women), but
if they were to receive the program, 88 percent (122 of 140 women) would have access to outside
employment.
Since our sampling strategy relied on networks, we do not have a randomly-selected sample.
Statewide data14 on NREGS show that in 2010, women in untreated districts used an average of 35
percent of the person-days of work generated by NREGS, while in treated districts, they used an
14District-level data on women's access to NREGS identication cards are not available for the entire state.
30average of 41 percent, which is consistent with Mahila Samakhya having a positive eect on access
to outside employment, and suggests that our estimates reect statewide trends.
7 Conclusion
This paper uses primary data from the north Indian state of Uttarakhand to study the impact of
a community-level program called Mahila Samakhya. Mahila Samakhya aims to empower women
through education and information, taking a grassroots approach to its implementation. We con-
ceptually disentangle the eect of the Mahila Samakhya program into a direct component that
works through access to outside employment and an increased reservation wage, as well as an in-
direct component that works through information spillovers. This distinction between direct and
indirect eects extends beyond the Mahila Samakhya program to other programs operating at the
community-level that may have spillover eects.
The empirical evidence presented in this paper indicates that Mahila Samakhya both directly
and indirectly succeeds in helping empower women. Using PSM, we compare the outcomes of
participants to those of untreated women. We also use 2SLS to instrument for the decision to
participate using the roll-out of the program. By comparing participants to untreated women and
using 2SLS to control for self-selection in the participation decision, we provide accurate estimates
of the impact of the Mahila Samakhya program on women's economic, social, and intrahousehold
empowerment. Had we directly compared participants to non-participants within the same district
or failed to control for selection, we would have misestimated the true eect of participation.
We nd that the program has resulted in signicant increases in women's access to outside
employment, their ability to leave home without permission, and their political participation, all
of which are associated with higher levels of bargaining power. We also nd that participants who
do not work are still more able to leave the house without permission and have more access to
outside employment. Matching non-participants to untreated women, we nd little evidence of
signicant dierences in empowerment levels, suggesting that the higher empowerment outcomes
of participants are due to Mahila Samakhya. After correcting for truncation in the distribution of
31participants, we nd that non-participants are signicantly more likely to own NREGS cards than
untreated women. We suggest that this result is evidence of positive spillover eects of the program
on non-participating neighbors.
The marginal eects of the impact of Mahila Samakhya on empowerment translate to signicant
increases in the number of women with higher empowerment outcomes. If the untreated districts in
our sample were to be covered by Mahila Samakhya, 17 percent more women (an increase of 20 out
of 120 women) would be able to go out without permission, 33 percent more (an increase of 30 out
of 131 women) would participate in village council meetings, and 58 percent more (an increase of
95 out of 140 women) would have NREGS cards. These numbers highlight the potential of Mahila
Samakhya in eecting signicant social change.
Results also show that even participants who do not have access to outside employment are
more empowered than untreated women. One could envision criticism of the program for spending
scarce resources on individuals who do not then use their new-found skills to nd employment,
but we show that the increased reservation wage is benecial in and of itself. Further, we nd
evidence that Mahila Samakhya had an indirect eect generating empowerment outcomes for non-
participating women that were higher than untreated women, implying the program has a spillover
eect. This indirect eect likely works through either increasing access to information such as with
a demonstration eect, or by changing social norms within the village. Understanding these indirect
eects calls for further research.
The Mahila Samakhya intervention adopts a slow and careful grassroots approach to rolling
out its activities. Thus, our results cannot be generalized to programs following a faster, more
individual-focused, or a top-down approach. Further, these results should be interpreted with some
caution if selection on unobservables is a serious concern. That said, any bias from unaccounted-for
program placement would likely be in the downward direction because the program would target
women with low levels of empowerment. Thus, women in treated districts would, by design, have
worse empowerment outcomes than the untreated, leading to the results being lower bounds on the
true treatment eect.
The Mahila Samakhya program is unique, but it may be fruitfully replicated elsewhere in the
32developing world because it attempts to harness local peer networks to empower women. The
success of this program has encouraging implications not just for female empowerment goals, but
also for the other factors aected by empowerment, such as child welfare. By empowering women to
have greater say in their households and communities and to engage in income-generating activities,
the program may generate signicant benets to the rest of the participant's household.
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378 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Respondent's Age 472 32.18 8.11 20 65
Husband's Age 437 37.89 9.25 23 80
Respondent's Age at Marriage 463 19.25 3.34 1 30
Average age of sons 487 8.09 7.79 0 36
Average age of daughters 487 6.20 6.70 0 30
Respondent's Years of Education 483 7.19 5.02 0 17
Husband's Years of Education 415 10.11 3.71 0 17
Sons' Years of Education 487 3.766 4.45 0 17
Daughters' Years of Education 487 3.11 4.29 0 17
Number of Rooms 487 3.33 2.12 0 19
Electrication 487 0.89 0.31 0 1
38Table 2: Dependent Variables
Dependent Variables Percent Yes Observations












39Table 3: Treated and Untreated Districts
Variables Untreated Treated Dierence t-test Observations
Demographics
Spousal Age Ratio 0.85 0.85 -0.03 -0.17 487
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Age at Marriage 19.76 18.69 1.08 1.33 487
(0.05) (0.54) (0.81)
Age of Sons 6.96 9.03 -2.07 -1.66 487
(0.84) (0.76) (1.25)
Age of Daughters 5.45 6.98 -1.52 -1.78 487
(0.46) (0.84) (1.29)
Number of Sons 1.09 1.38 -0.29 -2.27
 487
(0.04) (0.08) (0.13)
Number of Daughters 0.99 1.13 -0.14 -1.29 487
(0.05) (0.07) (0.11)
Own-to-husband's education 0.65 0.61 0.03 0.35 487
(0.12) (0.04) (0.09)
Lives with Husband
z 0.83 0.76 0.07 0.42 449
(0.09) (0.09) (0.04)
Lives with In-laws
z 0.56 0.45 0.11 1.18 487
(0.11) (0.04) (0.09)
Works
z 0.45 0.65 -0.08 -1.11 454
(0.07) (0.12) (0.18)
Brahmin
z 0.21 0.14 0.07 0.45 487
(0.21) (0.06) (0.16)




Number of Rooms 3.58 3.07 0.51 0.96 487
(0.49) (0.29) (0.53)
House has Electricity
z 0.90 0.88 0.02 0.21 487
(0.004) (0.05) (0.08)
Improved Toilet
z 0.18 0.21 0.04 -0.30 487
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05)
Floor
y 1.41 1.55 -0.14 -0.43 487
(0.41) (0.14) (0.33)
Walls
y 1.39 1.76 -0.37 -1.85 487
(0.18) (0.11) (0.19)
z No=0; Yes=1. y Impermeable=1; semi-permeable=2; permeable=3
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
40Table 4: Participants and Non-participants in Districts with Mahila Samakhya
Variables Non-part. Part. Dierence t-test Observations
Demographics
Spousal Age Ratio 0.84 0.86 -0.03 -2.53
 303
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age at Marriage 18.48 19.17 -0.69 1.63 327
(0.38) (0.21) (0.42)
Age of Sons 7.26 8.97 -1.71 -1.81 345
(0.77) (0.50) (0.95)
Age of Daughters 6.33 6.54 -0.21 -0.25 345
(0.73) (0.44) (0.84)
Number of Sons 1.16 1.37 -0.21 -1.87 345
(0.09) (0.06) (0.11)
Number of Daughters 0.98 1.14 -0.16 -1.31 345
(0.08) (0.07) (0.12)
Own-to-husband's education 0.66 0.58 0.07 1.38 345
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Low Education
z 0.29 0.31 -0.14 -0.26 345
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Lives with Husband




z 0.55 0.44 0.12 1.90 345
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Works
z 0.52 0.59 -0.06 -1.02 336
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Brahmin
z 0.05 0.21 -0.16 -3.51
 347
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)




Number of Rooms 3.09 3.30 -0.21 -0.81 345
(0.21) (0.13) (0.26)
House Has Electricity
z0.89 0.89 0.00 0.01 345
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
Improved Toilet
z 0.28 0.26 0.02 0.35 345
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Floor
y 1.63 1.86 -0.23 -1.71 345
(0.08) (0.11) (0.14)
Walls
y 1.77 1.81 -0.03 -0.25 345
(0.08) (0.10) (0.13)
zNo=0; Yes=1. yImpermeable=1; semi-permeable=2; permeable=3
Standard errors in parentheses.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
41Table 5: Does Participation in Mahila Samakhya Empower Women? (PSM Results)
Non-Participants vs. the Untreated
Unmatched Spousal Has NREGS Can Go Out Council Respondent
Age Ratio Card W/o Permission Meetings Works
Non-participants 0.835 0.719 0.671 0.152 0.641
Untreated 0.849 0.256 0.578 0.0986 0.523
Dierence -0.015 0.463 0.093 0.053 0.118
(0.014) (0.071)
 (0.081) (0.055) (0.097)
Matched Spousal Has NREGS Can Go Out Council Respondent
Age Ratio Card W/o Permission Meetings Works
Non-participants 0.835 0.719 0.671 0.152 0.641
Untreated 0.839 0.634 0.747 0.089 0.297
Dierence -0.004 0.085 -0.076 0.063 0.344
(0.033) (0.213) (0.221) (0.148) (0.031)
Observations 160 160 143 150 108
Participants vs. the Untreated
Unmatched Spousal Has NREGS Can Go Out Council Respondent
Age Ratio Card W/o Permission Meetings Works
Participants 0.862 0.809 0.793 0.502 0.581
Untreated 0.850 0.177 0.654 0.205 0.440






Matched Spousal Has NREGS Can Go Out Council Respondent
Age Ratio Card W/o Permission Meetings Works
Participants 0.862 0.809 0.793 0.502 0.581
Untreated 0.848 0.144 0.361 0.414 0.321




Observations 341 339 312 332 315
Standard errors in parentheses.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
42Table 6: Does Participation in Mahila Samakhya Empower Women Who Do Not Work? (PSM
Results)
Participants vs. the Untreated
Unmatched Has NREGS Can Go Out Council
Card W/o Permission Meetings
Participants 0.730 0.667 0.416
Untreated 0.179 0.708 0.315
Dierence 0.552 -0.042 0.101
(0.072)
 (0.085) (0.084)
Matched Has NREGS Can Go Out Council
Card W/o Permission Meetings
Participants 0.730 0.667 0.416
Untreated 0.101 0.500 0.146




Observations 145 132 143
Standard errors in parentheses.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
43Table 7: Does Participation in Mahila Samakhya Empower Women Who Do Not Have NREGS
Cards? (PSM Results)
Participants vs. the Untreated
















Standard errors in parentheses.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
44Figure 1: Propensity Scores for Program Participation
45Table 8: Does Participation in Mahila Samakhya Empower Women Who Do Not Work?
(Truncation-corrected PSM Results)
Non-Participants vs. the Untreated
Unmatched Spousal Has NREGS Can Go Out Council Respondent
Age Ratio Card W/o Permission Meetings Works
Non-participants 0.822 0.667 0.722 0.130 0.579
Untreated 0.824 0.147 0.629 0.100 0.440
Dierence -0.003 0.519 0.093 0.030 0.139
(0.029) (0.110)
 (0.146) (0.089) (0.060)

Matched Spousal Has NREGS Can Go Out Council Respondent
Age Ratio Card W/o Permission Meetings Works
Non-participants 0.822 0.667 0.722 0.130 0.579
Untreated 0.729 0.125 0.611 0.000 0.341
Dierence 0.093 0.54 0.111 0.130 0.238
(0.075) (0.254)
 (0.213) (0.072) (0.168)
Observations 58 58 45 53 44
Participants vs. the Untreated
Unmatched Spousal Has NREGS Can Go Out Council Respondent
Age Ratio Card W/o Permission Meetings Works
Participants 0.861 0.808 0.797 0.505 0.582
Untreated 0.851 0.177 0.654 0.205 0.427






Matched Spousal Has NREGS Can Go Out Council Respondent
Age Ratio Card W/o Permission Meetings Works
Participants 0.861 0.808 0.797 0.505 0.582
Untreated 0.846 0.131 0.367 0.407 0.647




Observations 340 338 311 331 314
Standard errors in parentheses.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001












Less Than Four Years of Education  0:022
( 0:26)
Own Years of Education  0:003
( 0:49)
Number of Children 0:063
(1:61)





Lives with In-laws  0:106

( 2:10)
Lives with Sister-in-law  0:443
( 1:03)
LN(Firewood Collection Time) 0:041

(3:78)
Number of Rooms 0:003
(0:24)




t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
47Table 10: Does Participation in Mahila Samakhya Empower Women? (Robust 2SLS Estimates)
(1) (2) (3)
Can Go Out Village Council Has NREGS






Own Age  0:002 0:006
  0:005
( 0:66) (1:97) ( 0:81)
Spousal Age Ratio  0:499  0:224  0:026
( 1:81) ( 0:85) ( 0:06)
Less than Four Years of Education  0:057 0:058  0:015
( 0:64) (0:62) ( 0:10)
Literate  0:092 0:005  0:116
( 1:46) (0:07) ( 0:94)
Own Years of Education  0:008  0:002 0:002
( 1:00) ( 0:22) (0:18)
Number of Children 0:009  0:028  0:122
(0:94) ( 0:61) ( 1:69)
Age of Children 0:004 0:003 0:016
(0:94) (0:61) (1:90)
Brahmin  0:032  0:065  0:588

( 0:44) ( 0:95) ( 5:11)
Lives with In-laws  0:044 0:015 0:172
( 0:73) (0:28) (1:88)
Lives with Sister-in-law 1:012
 0:905 0:902
(2:30) (1:94) (1:19)
LN(Firewood Collection Time)  0:015 0:008  0:034
( 1:09) (0:63) ( 1:40)
Number of Rooms  0:018 0:001 0:007
( 1:25) (0:09) (0:34)






Observations 391 411 421
First-stage F-stat 12:38 11:90 13:55
p-value for Sargan's test 0:242 0:803 0:579
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
48Figure 2: Predicted Outcomes from 2SLS: Non-participants versus Untreated
49Figure 3: Predicted Outcomes from 2SLS: Participants versus Untreated
50Table 11: Does Participation in Mahila Samakhya Increase Reservation Wages? (Robust 2SLS
Estimates)
Women Who Do Not Work Women Without NREGS Cards
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Can Go Out Village Council Has NREGS Can Go Out Village Council
W/o Perm. Part. Card W/o Perm. Part.
Participation 0:034  0:082 2:220
 1:134
 0:638
(0:08) ( 0:24) (2:55) (2:40) (1:66)
Own age  0:0002 0:018
  0:012  0:008 0:002
( 0:03) (3:14) ( 0:85) ( 0:95) (0:38)
Spousal Age Ratio  0:642  0:731  0:430  1:011  0:231
( 1:34) ( 1:65) ( 0:47) ( 1:55) ( 0:54)
<4 Years of Ed. 0:059 0:011 0:397  0:150 0:087
(0:35) (0:06) (0:97) ( 0:68) (0:49)
Literate  0:098 0:070  0:210 0:169  0:147
( 0:90) (0:51) ( 0:60) (0:87) ( 0:98)
Own Years of Ed. 0:0004  0:006 0:039  0:015 0:004
(0:02) ( 0:42) (1:34) ( 1:09) (0:37)
Number of Children 0:046  0:016  0:175  0:034  0:074
(0:55) ( 0:24) ( 1:17) ( 0:54) ( 1:16)
Age of Children 0:003 0:019
 0:007 0:009 0:014
(0:30) (2:28) (0:32) (0:84) (1:94)
Brahmin  0:032 0:196  1:215
  0:371  0:227
( 0:15) (1:11) ( 2:87) ( 1:71) ( 1:50)
Lives with In-laws  0:057 0:081 0:393
 0:195 0:136
( 0:64) (0:93) (2:00) (1:27) (1:21)
Lives with Sis.-in-law 1:504
 0:442 2:166 0:925 0:407
(2:01) (0:51) (1:21) (1:09) (0:64)
LN(Firewood Time)  0:008 0:020  0:064  0:069
 0:002
( 0:33) (0:90) ( 1:06) ( 2:03) (0:09)
Number of Rooms  0:012  0:017 0:062  0:044  0:028
( 0:55) ( 0:99) (1:68) ( 1:24) ( 1:24)
House Has Electricity 0:290
 0:138 0:119 0:480
 0:087
(2:38) (1:37) (0:55) (2:73) (0:67)
Constant 1:107
 0:072  0:473 1:376 0:029
(2:51) (0:17) ( 0:48) (1:91) (0:07)
Observations 163 175 178 144 157
First-stage F-stat 8:54 8:03 8:54 11:75 7:27
p-value for Sargan's test 0:391 0:818 0:908 0:511 0:569
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
51Table 12: Average Treatment Eects from 2SLS Estimtes
Average Treatment Eect
NREGS 0.818
Can Go Out W/O Permission 0.204
Village Council 0.269
Average Treatment Eect on Participants
NREGS 0.893
Can Go Out W/O Permission 0.222
Village Council 0.295
Average Treatment Eect on Non-participants
NREGS 0.643
Can Go Out W/O Permission 0.159
Village Council 0.212
Average Treatment Eect on Untreated
NREGS 0.621
Can Go Out W/O Permission 0.155
Village Council 0.205
52Figure 4: Estimated Treatment Eects from 2SLS and PSM
53